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Abstract
This paper examines decision-making by political candidates under three
dierent objective functions. In particular, we are interested in when the
optimal strategies for expected vote share, expected plurality, and probability
of victory maximizing candidates coincide in simple plurality elections. It is
shown here that if voters' behavior, conditional on the policies proposed by
the candidates, is identical from the candidates' perspective, and candidates
are restricted to choosing pure strategies, then all three objectives lead to the
same best response function when there are two candidates and abstention is
not allowed. We then provide a counter-example to Hinich's claim of general
asymptotic equivalence in two candidate elections without abstention in which
voter types are independently, but not identically distributed. In addition, we
provide a counterexample to general best response equivalence between these
objective functions in two candidate elections in which abstention is allowed,
but our other assumptions are satised. Finally, an example of why our
result can not be immediately extended to arbitrary numbers of candidates
is provided.
1 Introduction
Spatial models of elections often assume that the candidates' sole goal is victory. To
calculate the optimal strategy for such a candidate, one must take into account the
probability of victory resulting from each strategy. In general, this probability is not a
trivial computation, especially when studying probabilistic voting models (e.g. Hinich
(1977), Coughlin and Nitzan (1981a), (1981b), Ledyard (1984), and McKelvey and Patty
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(1999)). For this reason, researchers have sought candidate objectives which are easier
to compute and yet lead to the same predictions as those generated by probability of
victory.
If two candidate objective functions yield identical best response functions, we will
refer to them as being equivalent. Regardless of one's opponents' strategies, the opti-
mal strategy under one objective function is identical to that under the other objective
function when the two are equivalent.
It follows immediately that equivalent objective functions yield identical Nash equi-
librium predictions.
1
Two objective functions may, on the other hand, still yield identical
Nash equilibrium strategies without being equivalent. We refer to such objective func-
tions as exhibiting equilibrium equivalence. Either type of equivalence is useful, since
theoretical treatments of candidate competition are often concerned solely with Nash
equilibria, but we will limit ourselves to the question of best-response equivalence in this
paper. The question of equilibrium equivalence between maximization of expected vote
share and maximization of probability of victory is examined in Patty (1999).
Several articles discussing properties of dierent candidate strategies were published
in the 1970s. Foremost among these early eorts is Aranson, Hinich, and Ordeshook
(1974). Aranson, et al. oer an equivalence result which rests on assumptions regarding
perturbations of the candidate's objective functions, perhaps representing forecast errors.
Their result, however, requires that these forecast errors are unbiased and, more impor-
tantly, that the errors are uncorrelated with the strategies chosen by the candidates.
As the authors point out, this assumption is untenable, since the value of the objective
functions (even after the errors are taken into account) must fall between zero and one.
A second equivalence result obtained by Aranson, et al. requires that the votes received
in a two candidate election be distributed according to a multivariate normal distribu-
tion. This obviously requires that negative vote totals be a positive probability event.
Aranson, et al. were unable to oer any equivalence results between expected plurality
and probability of victory which did not depend on ad hoc assumptions, however.
Hinich (1977), however, provided justication for examining expected vote share in
place of probability of victory which depended only on the Central Limit Theorem.
Asymptotically, Hinich claimed, the two objective functions converged in 2 candidate
elections without abstention. This claim was extended by Ledyard (1984) to include 2
candidate elections in which abstention is allowed. Neither Hinich nor Ledyard proved
their results, each for dierent reasons. Hinich's proposition is merely a statement.
Ledyard's paper does not need a general equivalence result for the major conclusions to
hold.
2
The existing literature has shown that equivalence results do not hold in general.
1
For a more detailed discussion of this, see Aranson, Hinich, and Ordeshook (1974), p. 144-145.
2
Ledyard argues at the limit, which is never actually realized in his framework. In addition, there is a
discontinuity at the limit, making his argument impossible to generalize immediately for nite numbers
of voters.
2
In order to show equivalence between maximizing plurality and probability of victory,
three things are assumed to hold. Voters do not condition their actions on the actions of
other voters, voters are using symmetric voting strategies and candidate's strategies are
announced simultaneously. In Section 3, a statement and discussion of Hinich's claim is
given, as well as a statement of Ledyard's result. The focus of the section is Theorem 1,
which states that Hinich's claim holds for any number of voters so long as the assumptions
imposed in this paper hold. In Section 4 abstention is allowed with two candidates. It is
shown that Theorem 1 can not be extended to this case. Section 5 concludes with three
examples and oers possible extensions of this work.
2 The Model
LetN denote a nite set of voters, with jN j = N , and J denote a nite set of alternatives,
with jJ j = J . We denote the set of candidates by J
0
 J , with jJ
0
j = J
0
. Each
candidate j chooses a policy, x
j
2 X, where X denotes the policy space. We will
denote the J
0
-dimensional vector of all policies by x, and the space of all such vectors
by Y = X
J
0
. Finally, we will denote the vector of all announced policies, other than the
policy announced by candidate j, by x
 j
.
2.1 Voter Behavior
Each voter i 2 N is characterized by a response function, p
i
: X
J
0
! (J ), where (Y )
denotes the space of all possible lotteries over the set Y . Such a function can be thought
of as the strategy of voter i, for example. We will denote the probability a alternative
j 2 J receives voter i's vote, conditional on policy proposal vector x, by p
i
(j; x).
Throughout the paper, we assume that each p
i
characterizes an independent stochastic
process.
3
This is stated formally below.
Assumption 1 (Independence) Conditional on a vector of policy proposals, x 2 Y ,
the set of p
i
(x) are mutually independent random variables, for all i 2 N .
We now use the set of p
i
(x) to dene two dierent candidate objective functions. For
simplicity, we dene objective functions with respect to pure strategies, as the extension
to mixed strategies is obvious.
3
That is, conditional on the vector of policy proposals x, voters act independently.
3
2.2 Maximizing Plurality
Given x
 j
, an expected plurality maximizing candidate j 2 J
0
seeks to maximize
V
j
(x) =
1
N
E
"
N
X
i=1
1 fp
i
(x) = jg   max
k2J
0
;k 6=j
"
N
X
i=1
1 fp
i
(x) = kg
##
: (2.1)
That is, an expected plurality maximizing candidate seeks to maximize the dierence
between her own vote share and the maximum vote share received by any of the other
candidates.
4
In the case of two candidates without abstention,
V
1
(x) =
1
N
N
X
i=1
[p
i
(1; x)  p
i
(2; x)]: (2.2)
It should be noted that Equation 2.2 does not directly extend to cases with more than 2
alternatives.
2.3 Maximizing Probability of Victory
R
j
(x) = Pr
"
N
X
i=1
1 [p
i
(x) = j] > max
k 6=j
"
N
X
i=1
1 [p
i
(x) = k]
##
+
J
0
X
t=2
1
t
(j; t; p(x)); (2.3)
where (j; t; p) denotes the probability of a tie between t candidates including j, given
p(x) = fp
1
(x); : : : ; p
N
(x)g.
We will refer to the following lemma in our proof of Theorem 1. It is stated without
proof, as it follows immediately from Assumption 1
Lemma 1 R
j
(x) is continuously dierentiable in p(x) for all j, for arbitrary values of
J .
3 The Main Result
First it is shown that, for all N with J = 2, maximizing expected plurality, V
j
(x) is
equivalent to maximizing expected vote share,
1
N
P
N
i=1
p
i
(j; x).
4
Note that expected plurality maximizing candidates are assumed to not care about beating alterna-
tives which can not win the election anyway, such as abstention. This implicitly rules out nonstrategic
alternatives which can win the election, such as a choice of \None of the above", for instance.
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Proposition 1 Assume that J = 2 and the p
i
(x) are, conditional on x, mutually inde-
pendent random variables (i.e., Assumption 1 holds). Then, for any j and all x
 j
,
argmax
X
V
j
(x) = argmax
X
1
N
N
X
i=1
p
i
(j; x):
Proof : By Assumption 1 and J = 2,
V
1
(x) =
1
N
N
X
i=1
[p
i
(1; x)  p
i
(2; x)]
=
1
N
N
X
i=1
[2p
i
(1; x)  1]:
=
2
N
[
N
X
i=1
p
i
(1; x)]  1:
Thus, since the choice of candidate 1 is arbitrary, V
j
(x) is an increasing ane transfor-
mation of
1
N
P
N
i=1
p
i
(j; x), proving the proposition.
3.1 Admissible Games
We now restrict attention to elections which satisfy an admittedly stringent symmetry
condition. In particular, we require for all voters to have identical response functions.
Formally, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2 (Symmetry) For all i; j 2 N and all x 2 Y ,
p
i
(x) = p
j
(x):
We will describe any game with J = J
0
= 2 which satises Assumptions 1 and 2 as
admissible.
It is now shown that, in any admissible game, candidates seeking to maximize prob-
ability of victory in the case of an anonymous type distribution and plurality rule will
seek to maximize expected plurality, regardless of the number of voters.
The following lemma makes the proof almost immediate.
Lemma 2
N
X
c=
d
N
2
e

N
c


p
c 1
(1  p)
N c 1
(c Np)

 0;
where the inequality is strict for all p 2 (0; 1).
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Proof : The cases p = 0 and p = 1 are trivial. Therefore, assume p 2 (0; 1). Let X = X
N
be a Binomial(N; p) random variable. Dene Z = Z
N
= X   Np to be the mean zero
standardization of X. Note then that
N
X
c=0

N
c


p
c
(1  p)
N c
(c Np)

= 0;
p(1  p) 
N
X
c=0

N
c


p
c 1
(1  p)
N c 1
(c Np)

= 0:
It follows that
p(1  p) 
N
X
c=D

N
c


p
c 1
(1  p)
N c 1
(c Np)

> 0
for any D > 0, so that
N
X
c=
d
N
2
e

N
c


p
c 1
(1  p)
N c 1
(c Np)

> 0
for all p 2 (0; 1), completing the proof.
Theorem 1 For any admissible game,
x
j
2 argmax
X
V (x), x
j
2 argmax
X
R(x):
Proof : To show the result, it suces to show that R(x) is an increasing function of
p(j; x).
Lemma 1 ensures that we can dierentiate R(x) with respect to p(j; x). For notational
ease, let R
j
= R(x) and p
j
= p(j; x). Doing so and taking the rst derivative of R
j
with
respect to p
j
, we obtain
@R
j
@p
j
=
N
X
c=
d
N
2
e

N
c


cp
c 1
j
(1  p
j
)
N c
  (N   c)p
c
j
(1  p
j
)
N c 1

;
=
N
X
c=
d
N
2
e

N
c


p
c 1
j
(1  p
j
)
N c 1
(c(1  p
j
)  (N   c)p
j
)

;
=
N
X
c=
d
N
2
e

N
c


p
c 1
j
(1  p
j
)
N c 1
(c Np
j
)

; (3.1)
> 0; (3.2)
where the nal inequality comes from Lemma 2. Thus, the probability of victory is a
strictly increasing function of the expected vote and by Proposition 1, a strictly increasing
function of expected plurality.
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Theorem 1 only gives sucient conditions for best response equivalence. We would
like to provide necessary conditions as well, but the following examples show that As-
sumptions 1 and 2, respectively, are not necessary for best response equivalence.
Example 1 LetX = fL;Rg be a binary policy space, J = J
0
= f1; 2g, andN = 3. The
voters' response functions are identical, but do not satisfy Assumption 1. In particular,
the voters' responses are given by the following rule, where v
i
denotes the action of voter
i, and v denotes the vector of all v
i
.
v =
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
:
(1; 1; 1) if x = (L;R)

(1; 1; 1) with probability 0:5
(2; 2; 2) with probability 0:5
if x = (L; L)

(1; 1; 1) with probability 0:5
(2; 2; 2) with probability 0:5
if x = (R;R)
(2; 2; 2) if x = (R;L)
That is, in all states, the voters vote unanimously for one candidate, and prefer position
L.
Regardless of whether a candidate is maximizing expected vote share, expected plu-
rality, or probability of victory, the pure strategy L weakly dominates all other pure
and mixed strategies. In fact, L is the unique best response for either candidate to any
strategy chosen by her opponent under any of the three objective functions. Thus, best
response equivalence holds in this case, even though Assumption 1 does not hold. 4
Example 2 Let X = [0; 1], N = 3, J = J
0
= f1; 2g, and let the voters' response
functions satisfy Assumption 1. In particular, assume the following response functions.
p
1
(1; x) =
1
2
p
2
(1; x) =
1
2
+
1
2
(x
1
  x
2
)
p
3
(1; x) =
1
2
 
1
2
(x
1
  x
2
):
Thus, voter 1's behavior is completely unresponsive to the policies announced by the
candidates, while voters 2 and 3 each are more likely to choose the candidates announcing
the rightmost and leftmost policies, respectively.
It follows easily that the expected vote share and expected plurality of either candi-
date is invariant to the vector of policies chosen by the candidates, with each candidate
receiving an expected vote share of 0.5 and an expected plurality of zero. In calculating
the best response correspondence for candidate 2 under maximization of probability of
victory, we obtain
R
2
(x) = (0:5)

1  2[x
1
  x
2
]
2
+ 2[x
1
  x
2
]
2

= 0:5
7
for all choices of x
1
and x
2
, implying that a probability of victory maximizing candidate
is indierent between all policies, regardless of the opponent's strategy. Since this holds
under all of the three objective functions, best response equivalence holds in this model,
in which voters' behavior does not satisfy Assumption 2. 4
The above example can be generalized in the following way. This general equivalence
will hold in any two candidate election in which the set of voters' response functions
satisfy the following condition. Let p denote the set of voters' response functions, and
let  be an ordering
5
of N . Then both candidates are indierent as to which policy they
choose, regardless of the strategy of the other candidates, under expected vote share,
expected plurality, or probability of victory maximization, if, for all i 2 N , for some
ordering , and for all x; y 2 X,
p
i
(x) + p
(i)
(x) = p
i
(y) + p
(i)
(y):
Thus, for every voter i whose behavior responds to the policies chosen by the candidates,
there exists another voter j whose behavior exactly counterbalances i's behavior.
6
This section is concluded with an example of another special case when maximizing
plurality and maximizing probability of victory yield equivalent best response strategies,
regardless of the number of candidates or voters.
Example 3 (Identical Platforms) Let J = J
0
 2 and consider candidate 1. Assume
that x
2
= x
3
: : : = x
J
= x

. So long as this assumption holds, then maximizing plurality
and maximizing probability of winning are equivalent objective functions for candidate
1 (i.e. they yield identical best response functions). The intuition behind this result is
straightforward, if not obvious. Any votes lost (alternatively, gained) by candidate 1 as
a result of a change in her platform are gained (lost) equally (in expectation) by the
other candidates, since the change in the dierence of utility between candidate 1 and
candidate j 6= 1 is identical for all j 6= 1. Because of this, the expected vote for candidate
1 is a sucient statistic for the expected vote of every other candidate. Thus, from the
perspective of candidate 1, this situation is identical to the case where J = 2.
7
4
4 Abstention
The previous section provided a theorem which strengthens Hinich's statement that, in
two candidate elections without abstention and without coordination by voters, maxi-
mizing plurality and probability of victory yielded equivalent strategies in equilibrium.
5
An ordering of a nite set Z is a one-to-one and onto function from Z into itself.
6
Oddly enough, this condition is, in some sense, similar to the necessary and sucient conditions
characterized by Plott (1967) for existence of a core in the multidimensional spatial competition model.
7
Indeed, it is possible to relabel this example so that it is identical to the case where J = 2 and the
voters' errors are biased against candidate 1.
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As discussed in the conclusion, the proposition proved here for J = 2 is both weaker
and stronger than Hinich's original claim, but it is obviously concerned with a very spe-
cial case, since abstention is generally allowed in most elections, for example. When
abstention is allowed, maximizing expected vote is generally not equivalent to maximiz-
ing plurality, as we show in Example 6. In this section, we provide an example of a
2 candidate election in which abstention is allowed and voters' behavior satises both
Assumptions 1 and 2, but maximizing plurality and maximizing probability of victory
do not exhibit best response equivalence.
4.1 Probability of Victory Revisited
Ledyard (1984) argues that, asymptotically, maximization of V (x) and R(x) are equiv-
alent when J
0
= 2 and J = 3. However, Ledyard argues at the limit. When J = 3,
J
0
= 2, and voters' behavior satises Assumptions 1 and 2, expected plurality can be
expressed as
V
j
(x) =
p(j; x)
p(1; x) + p(2; x)
 
p( j; x)
p(1; x) + p(2; x)
; (4.1)
for j 2 f1; 2g.
The next example, due to John Duggan, highlights why best response equivalence
fails to hold in 2 candidate elections with abstention, even when voter behavior satises
Assumptions 1 and 2.
Example 4 Assume throughout that voter behavior satises Assumptions 1 and 2. Let
N = 3, J = 3, J
0
= 2, and consider two policy positions, x; y 2 Y , with x = (x
1
; x
2
)
and y = (x
0
1
; x
2
), characterized by the following voter behavior, where p(z) = (a; b; c)
means that, given policy proposal vector z, the probability of any given voter voting for
candidate 1 is a, while the probability of voting for candidate 2 is b and the probability
of abstention is c:
p(x) = (0:02; 0:08; 0:90) and
p(y) = (0:53; 0:47; 0:00):
We will focus on candidate 1. It is straightforward to compute the following:
V
1
(x) = 0:0599

33
R
1
(x) = 0:581396;
while
V
1
(y) = 0:06
R
1
(y) = 0:544946;
9
so that V
1
(x) < V
1
(y), but R
1
(x) > R
1
(y).
The reason that the two objective functions are not equivalent is that, conditional on
any given voter showing up, the probability of candidate 1 receiving that voter's vote is
much higher at x than it is at y. It is interesting to note that if x
1
and x
0
1
are her only
choices, candidate 1 has a strict incentive to reduce expected turnout if she wishes to
maximize her probability of victory. 4
5 Where Do We Stand and Where Should We Go?
This section discusses the tightness of our assumptions, possible extensions of the results,
and what this paper contributes to our understanding of electoral incentives.
5.1 Extensions
For over twenty years, the theoretical literature has been largely silent on the impli-
cations of the modeler's choice of candidates' objectives. This paper proposes that a
re-examination of this silence is necessary.
First, the claim in Hinich (1977) regarding asymptotic equivalence of maximizing
expected vote and maximizing probability of victory in two candidate elections is not
obvious. For clarity, we quote the claim.
\If voters in a large electorate act independently, the distribution of a candidate's total
vote approximates a normal distribution for Bernoulli trials. The mean of this normal
distribution is the expected vote. Thus for large electorates, maximizing probability of
victory is equivalent to maximizing expected vote, which is also equivalent to maximizing
plurality since everyone votes." [Hinich (1977), pp. 212-213, Italics in original.]
Exactly when Hinich's claim holds is an open question. Theorem 1 states that Hinich's
claim is correct for nite electorates whenever voters' behavior satises Assumptions 1
and 2. We now show, however, that it is not true that best response equivalence holds in
all 2 candidate elections without abstention. In particular, we construct an example in
which voters' behavior does not satisfy Assumption 2. We also show that best response
equivalence does not hold in any nite electorate.
Example 5 Let J = J
0
= 2 and N = 3. Consider an election in which X = fL;Rg and
voter behavior is given by
p
11
(L; L) = p
21
(L; L) = p
31
(L; L) =
1
2
p
11
(R;R) = p
21
(R;R) = p
31
(R;R) =
1
2
;
10
while
p
11
(R;L) = "
p
21
(R;L) =
3
4
  "
p
31
(R;L) =
3
4
  ";
and
p
11
(L;R) = 1  "
p
21
(L;R) =
1
4
+ "
p
31
(L;R) =
1
4
+ "
If candidate 1 deviates to y, both her expected vote and expected plurality decrease by
", but for suciently small " > 0, her probability of victory is
lim
"!0

9
16
 
9
8
"+ 2"
2
  2"
3

>
1
2
:
Thus, even if we assume that (x; x) constitutes a strict global Nash equilibrium under
maximization of expected vote share, it is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium under
maximization of probability of victory. Thus, best response equivalence between the two
objective functions does not hold in general two candidate elections.
8
This example can be extended to arbitrary numbers of voters. Assuming that J = 2
and N odd, x any symmetric strategy prole, x, so that p
i1
=
1
2
for all i, and take voter
behavior to be such that
p
i1
(R;L) = " 8i 
N 1
2
;
p
i1
(R;L) =
N
N+1
  " 8i >
N 1
2
:
Again, deviating from (L; L) to (R;L) decreases both candidate 1's expected vote share
and expected plurality by ", but increases her probability of victory. Indeed, denoting
candidate 1's probability of victory by R(";N), it can be shown that
lim
"!0
lim
N!1
R(";N) =
1
p
e
>
1
2
:
Thus, even asymptotically, best response equivalence between the two objective functions
does not hold in general when voters' behavior fails to satisfy Assumption 2. 4
8
Since this example holds for an open interval of ", it immediately follows that the example includes
an open set of voter behavior.
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5.1.1 Multiple Candidates
Another open question regards multiple candidates. What can we say, if anything, about
the relationship between dierent incentives in such a framework? The next example,
due to Tom Palfrey, shows that asymptotic equivalence in our framework is not possible
without more restrictions.
Example 6 (Losing the Forest for the Trees) This example utilizes the fact that
an increase in one candidate's expected vote share does not necessarily imply a decrease
in every other candidate's expected vote share.
Let the policy space be the unit interval, voters' preferences be Euclidean, and let
there be three candidates. We assume that voter behavior is sincere: voters vote for
the candidate whose announced position is closest to the voter's ideal policy. We also
assume there is a continuum of voters. Assume that candidates 1 and 2, proposing x and
y, respectively, are adopting identical strategies. Candidate 3 is adopting a strategy, z,
which is dierent from that chosen by candidates 1 and 2. As it stands now, candidates
1 and 2 are each receiving 45% of the vote, while candidate 3 is receiving only 10% of
the vote. The probability of victory for candidates 1 and 2 is also equal at this strategy
prole. In particular, each candidate wins half of the time, while candidate 3 never wins.
Assume now that candidate 1 seeks to maximize her expected vote share and that
there exists a policy x
0
such that, given y and z, she will receive 475% of the vote, and
candidate 2 will receive 48% of the vote. Thus, candidate 1's vote share has increased,
but her probability of victory has gone to zero, since candidate 2's vote share is higher
than candidate 1's.
This example shows that, even with a continuum of voters, a candidate may increase
her expected vote share but decrease her probability of victory. This is generally the case
when there are more than 2 candidates. 4
Notice that Example 6 does not violate equivalence between expected plurality, as
dened above, and probability of victory. The question of asymptotic equivalence between
expected plurality and probability of victory with more than two candidates is an open
question.
A related question when studying elections with more than two candidates regards
the denition of expected plurality. For several reasons, the denition given in equation
(2.1) is not without problems. First of all, the idea of plurality is not clear in multiple
candidate elections. Why should the emphasis be placed solely on the dierent between
the two top vote-getters? Second, the calculation of equation (2.1) when J  3 is by no
means simple. One might conjecture that we can approximate equation (2.1) by
W
j
(x) = p(j; x)  max
k2J
0
k 6=j
[p(k; x)]:
12
The following example illustrates the failure of equivalence between that approxima-
tion and probability of victory in a case with 3 voters and 3 candidates.
Example 7 As mentioned earlier, the calculation of expected plurality is, in general, a
very complicated task when J > 2. This objective function depends on the expectation
of a rank order statistic generated by a sample of mutually dependent observations.
9
Therefore, one might hope to approximate V
j
(x) by
^
V
j
(x) = p(j; x)  max
k2J
0
;k 6=j
p(k; x):
This example shows that this approximation does not capture the behavior of V (x).
Suppose N = 3, J = 3 without abstention, and, at some policy vector, x 2 Y , the
probabilities of any given voter voting for each candidate are given by:
p
1
(x) = 0:45
p
2
(x) = 0:4
p
3
(x) = 0:15;
yielding
R
1
(x) = 0:47925
^
V
1
(x) = 0:05
V
1
(x) =  0:0390002:
Now suppose that there exists a y 2 Y such that y
2
= x
2
, y
3
= x
3
, and
p
1
(y) = 0:38
p
2
(y) = 0:31
p
3
(y) = 0:31;
yielding
R
1
(y) = 0:396492
^
V
1
(y) = 0:07
V
1
(y) =  0:322146:
Notice that
^
V
1
(y) >
^
V
1
(x), but R
1
(x) > R
1
(y) and V
1
(x) > V
1
(y). This dierence
between V and
^
V is due to the fact that
^
V represents only a subset of the information
represented by V . This subset is strict whenever J > 2.
4
9
While the individual behavior of any given agent is independent of the behavior of every other agent,
the sum of votes for any given candidate is dependent on the number of votes received by each other
candidate, since N is assumed to be xed.
13
While this example shows that equivalence between the approximation of V
j
and
R
j
is not going to hold in arbitrary nite electorates when jJ
0
j  3, it says nothing
about equivalence between V
j
and R
j
in these cases.
10
Thus, two open questions are
(1) what kind of equivalence, if any, holds between V
j
and R
j
in elections with more
than 3 candidates and (2) what other candidate objective functions might yield best
response functions identical to those yielded by maximization of probability of victory?
The answer to (2) would hopefully account for the tractability of the proposed objective
function.
5.2 Conclusions
In this paper we have attempted to make two contributions to the formal theory of elec-
tions. The rst of these is to point out that a rigorous statement and proof of Hinich's
(1977) claim that, asymptotically, maximizing plurality and maximizing probability of
victory yield equivalent strategies in equilibrium in two candidate elections without voter
abstention is not as obvious as might have been assumed. This is important if only be-
cause the claim has been widely cited in the literature. We also provide a counterexample
to the claim in order to show the need for further investigation into the topic.
The second contribution concerns two candidate elections. It is shown in Theorem
1 that, regardless of the number of voters, maximization of plurality and maximization
of probability of victory are equivalent objective functions (i.e. they yield identical best
response correspondences) in two candidate elections without abstention when voters'
behavior satises Assumptions 1 and 2.
As stated earlier, Theorem 1 is in some respects weaker, and in others stronger, than
Hinich's original statement. Hinich's claim does not require our symmetry condition,
Assumption 2. On the other hand, Hinich's claim is asymptotic, while Theorem 1 states
that the best response functions are identical for any number of voters.
10
Indeed, a candidate maximizing V
j
, rather than the approximation, would not move as the deviator
did in this example.
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Appendix A A Probabilistic Voting Framework
This appendix lays out a probabilistic voting framework which might generate the p
functions used in the paper to describe voter behavior.
Let X  R
M
denote the policy space and N = 1; 2; : : : ; N denote the set of voters.
The space of possible types of voter i is T
i
, a subset of some nite dimensional Euclidean
space, endowed with the usual topology, denoted by B. We will denote the Cartesian
product of the N type spaces by T .
The set of alternatives (which may include abstention) is denoted by J = 1; 2; : : : ; J ,
with J < N . We will denote the set of candidates (i.e. excluding abstention) by J
0
 J .
This set is exogenously given.
11
For any voter i, t
i
is assumed to be distributed according to a probability measure,

i
: T
i
! [0; 1]. Voter i is assumed to observe her type and the policy announcement,
x 2 X
J
0
. We assume the existence of a function s
i
: T
i
 X
J
0
! J , mapping policy
announcements and types into i's vote choice. We also assume that, for all i, 
i
and s
i
satisfy the following properties:
Assumption 3 (A1) 
i
is continuously dierentiable in t
i
and s
i
is continuously dif-
ferentiable in t
i
and x.
Assumption 4 (A2) For all b 2 B, (B) > 0.
Assumption 5 (A3) For all j 2 J
0
and all x 2 X
J
0
, there exists b 2 B such that t
i
2 b
implies s
i
(x; t
i
) = j.
Assumption A1 ensures that the probability that a randomly drawn voter votes for
any given candidate is well behaved. Assumptions A2 and A3 together ensure that the
expected vote for any candidate j 2 J
0
is strictly positive for all policy positions (this
is shown formally, below, in Lemma 3). Any 
i
and s
i
satisfying Assumptions A1, A2,
and A3 will be referred to as admissible.One nal assumption is
Assumption 6 (A4) For any pair of voters i; j with i 6= j, s
i
= s
j
, 
i
= 
j
and
t
i
; t
j
are distributed independently of each other. That is, given some N < 1, let  =
(t
1
; : : : ; t
N
) be distributed according to F
N
() =
Q
N
i=1
(t
i
).
Finally, any F for which there exists an admissible  such that F satises A4 will
also be referred to as admissible.
Candidates are assumed to announce policy positions, x
j
2 X, with x = (x
1
; : : : ; x
J
0
)
with no abstention. A candidate's announcement is assumed to be implemented if she
11
That is, we do not allow for strategic candidate entry.
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wins the election.
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Two objective functions are examined: (1) maximizing probability of
victory and (2) maximizing expected plurality. We assume that s, the individual strategy
for each voter, if common knowledge. Candidates do not observe the type prole of the
voters,  , but do possess a common prior over voter types which is equal to F . Given a
vector of candidate actions, x, candidate j perceives the election outcome as a random
variable which is determined by the realization of voter types. Thus, the framework
denes a Bayesian extensive form game.
A.1 Voter Behavior
Given a policy prole x, let p
i
(j; x) denote the probability that voter i chooses candidate
j, or, by the assumption that strategies are symmetric with respect to types and types
are i:i:d:,
p(j; x) = Pr [ft 2 T
i
js(x; t) = jg] : (A.1)
Denote the vector of p(j; x) for all j by p(x) and the vector of p(k; x) for all k 6= j by
p( j; x).
The following lemmata follow immediately.
Lemma 3 For any admissible  and any x 2 Y , p(x) 2 Int(
J
).
Proof : Take any x 2 Y and any candidate j. Then, by Assumption A3, x and j dene a
b
j;x
2 B such that for all t
i
2 b
j;x
s(x; t
i
) = j. Assumption A2 implies that the (b) > 0,
establishing the lemma.
Lemma 4 For any admissible , p(x) is everywhere continuously dierentiable.
Proof : This follows immediately from Assumption A1.
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